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Air-data systems (ADS) measure wind speed and direction, the loss of which requires 
aerodynamic forces to be estimated from inertial measurements and aircraft dynamics and 
performance models. The nature of ADS measurements require air-data probes be subject 
to the spectrum of environmental conditions. Even with designs meant to withstand harsh 
conditions, instances of ADS probe failure have been recorded for diverse platform types 
and situations. Further, since all ADS probes on a common platform are subject to the same 
conditions, instances of multiple simultaneous failures are not uncommon. Robust air data 
measurement therefore becomes a multi-sensor data-fusion problem wherein the system 
may be subject to failures that effect groups of like sensors, such as pitot-static probes, 
simultaneously. This paper presents an algorithm for fault detection and data fusion of ADS 
failures in the framework of an unmanned autonomous seaplane with a heritage of air-data 
probe failures. The fault detection scheme is based on sensor signal characterization and 
monitoring and on the comparison and fusion of redundant sensor measurements. A 
GPS/INS-driven backup will also be proposed that can be used both as an ADS diagnostic 
tool and to allow safe flight to an emergency landing or until air-data sensor functionality 
can otherwise be restored. Flight test data from two generations of unmanned seaplanes 
demonstrates the efficacy of the algorithm for a range of real-world failure cases with varied 
sensors. 
Nomenclature 
  =  angle-of-attach 
  = sideslip 
       = results of pass/fail test for a specific type of sensor health indicator 
  = decay parameter for exponential weighting determination 
  
  = signal variance 
      = roll, pitch, and yaw Euler angles 
   = confidence rating for the n
th
 sensor signal (0,1) 
k =  time-step, indicating discrete measurement or computation 
      = probability of that a specific type of sensor failure has accurately been detected 
   = n
th
 sensor signal 
      = sensor failure threshold for a certain test type 
  =  airspeed 
    =  airspeed vector in reference frame A 
     = variance function applied to signal s 
v1,v2 = left and right pitot-static measurements, respectively 
va = propeller anemometer measurements 
ve, vest = wind-model based airspeed estimate output 
vRESULT = fault-tolerance algorithm output, high-confidence airspeed result 
  = weighting coefficient 
     = estimated environmental wind vector 
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ONVENTIONAL air-data system (ADS) probes provide direct measurement of body-relative wind represented 
as airspeed (u), angle-of-attack (α), and sideslip (β) as well as pressure-based altitude (z) estimates. As stability 
margins are traded for efficiency/performance and levels of automation increase, measurements of wind-relative 
attitude and speed become more important. As such ADS are among the most basic and critical sensor packages 
onboard an aircraft and are generally comprised of similar, but not strictly homogeneous, environmental sensors. 
The nature of ADS measurements require probes to be directly exposed to the flight vehicle’s operating 
environment. In addition to human error and physical damage, foreign material infiltration and atmospheric 
anomalies (e.g., extremely high water content) are two of the most common causes of ADS probe failures.
1-4
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 and general aviation aircraft.
1,3,4
 Furthermore, though no comprehensive 
failure statistics are available, it follows that failures would also be experienced in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 
ADS probes. The immediate consequences of ADS failure are incorrect airspeed/direction and altitude readings. A 
human pilot will likely recognize the failure if the reading is clearly incorrect, but will be less likely to immediately 
notice if the reported values are reasonable even if they are based on incorrect measurements. Despite recognition, 
the human pilot might still have trouble maintaining stable flight without airspeed, particularly in turbulent 
atmospheric conditions. An autopilot, whether part of a manned or unmanned aircraft system, nominally 
incorporates airspeed into its flight control laws. Upon failure, if the erroneous data is not detected, control 
excursions can be substantial and induce unsafe flight conditions (e.g., pitching to a dive given an airspeed 
approaching stall). 
 Deployed commercial and UAS autopilots are generally not adaptive to incorrect ADS information, so the pilot 
of a manned aircraft will typically initiate manual flight control without direct knowledge of airspeed, while a UAS 
will either execute a safe ditch or be controlled remotely, again without airspeed data. The potential for an autopilot 
or pilot to react improperly to erroneous wind data introduces appreciable risk, as evidenced by accidents such as 
Aero Peru Flight 603, in which ground crews failed to remove tape from the pitot-static system after cleaning the 
aircraft, or the X-31A at NASA Dryden, in which pitot icing compromised system readings. Note that although 
redundant ADS probes are present on most high-cost aircraft, common failure modes or incorrect failure diagnosis 
has also resulted in catastrophic accidents, such as Austral Lineas Aeroeas Flight 2553 in which the flight crew 
improperly referenced the pilot’s airspeed indicator and induced structural failure by exceeding safe airspeed limits. 
This paper will present an ADS failure mitigation algorithm that fuses data from multiple wind and inertial 
sensors to diagnose and react to air-data sensor failures. The methods can be applied to a range of systems and 
sensor types but, for the purposes of this paper, the specific sensor measurements are defined in the context of 
instrumentation affixed to an unmanned seaplane with a history of pitot failures due to water ingestion. This 
motivating autonomous seaplane system will be introduced in the next section followed by a review of literature and 
statistics concerning the frequency and implications of ADS failures. The background section will conclude with a 
review of pertinent past research in ADS failure mitigation. Following the background materials our sensor fault 
detection and data-fusion algorithm is presented. Finally, results are provided from two generations of unmanned 
seaplane flight test programs that have demonstrated the efficacy of this solution. The paper concludes with an 
analysis of the capabilities and limitations of the presented algorithm. 
II. Background 
This section introduces a motivating case study from an unmanned seaplane program with a heritage of ADS 
failures. ADS fault tolerance is then motivated from past incidents, followed with a summary of our investigation 
into the impact, common causes, and mitigation strategies associated with ADS failures. Finally, fault identification 
and tolerance, in the context of ADS, are discussed 
A. Motivating Example: Autonomous Seaplanes 
In the summer of 2007, the Flying Fish autonomous unmanned seaplane
6-8
 first began open-water testing. During 
initial autonomous controller development an unpredictable ADS failure mode manifested through a variety of 
seemingly unrelated system malfunctions. The initially inexplicable behaviors included: failed automated takeoff, 
sudden pitch to stall, and sharp dives from cruise. The issues were manually traced to anomalous airspeed values 
due to water blockage of ADS probe ports. Like most floatplanes, the Flying Fish relied on a pressure-based 
pitot/static probe for airspeed determination, but unlike a full size floatplane the UAV’s scale prevented the probes 
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from being mounted any further than ~1.0m from the water’s surface. Unavoidable physical proximity, in 
combination with energetic transit over the water resulted in water impingement on the air-data probes. In-flight 
incidents revealed that ingested water might not immediately cause a failure, but that variations in flight attitude or 
airspeed might precipitate a delayed failure of a water-compromised probe. Blockages resulted in a wide range of 
erroneous measurements; while some blockages produced near constant output others displayed damped/biased 
tracking of actual airspeed. The Flying Fish ADS probe was subsequently relocated to minimize water incursion and 
a redundant probe and measurement system were added. Despite these modifications, however, water blockage 
issues still occurred, requiring the vehicle to be recovered and manually cleared of ingested water, often found well 
inside the pressure tubing where pitot heating is ineffective. A second-generation Flying Fish seaplane developed at 
the University of Michigan was equipped with a more comprehensive redundant ADS system. This vehicle has also 
experienced ADS sensor problems, although it is equipped with dual heated pitot probes further separated from the 
water. The new ADS system has redundancies including duplicate ADS sensors, different types of ADS sensing 
technologies, probe measurement redundancy, and failed-sensor recovery mechanisms. Specifically, the system 
includes two 5-hole pressure probes and a propeller-based anemometer. The 5-hole probes combine pitot/static 
airspeed measurement and barometric altitude with lateral/vertical differential pressures for the determination of 
angle of attack and side-slip angle. A heating element on each 5-hole-probe allows for cold weather operation and 
has sufficient heating capacity to rapidly evaporate freshwater blockages. Heat-based pitot clearing has not been 
evaluated in a marine environment where the mineral content of the water may contraindicate the application of 
evaporative clearing. The propeller-anemometer uses hall-effect sensors to measure the rotation rate of a small high-
pitch propeller in order to determine airspeed. Dual hall-effect sensors within the anemometer head provide 
redundant measurement of propeller rotation. 
B. Exploration of Air-Data System Failures 
The rates and impact of ADS failure on commercial, military, general, and unmanned aviation are nontrivial. 
Records and reports on the subject suggest that the problem may be increasingly prevalent, with growing air travel 
volume, and while research is being conducted on related topics no uniform solution yet exists. Aviation safety 
databases provide evidence of significant commercial aviation losses due to ADS failure. The Aviation Safety 
Network database has records of at least eleven ADS (pitot probe) failures over the past three decades that have 
resulted in significant damage or loss of life.
4
 These examples alone represent a nontrivial financial loss and 342 
documented fatalities (339 in the past 15 years). More recently, interim accident reports for Air France Flight 447 
indicate air data system anomalies were likely experienced
9
 and that Airbus platforms have had 35 recorded 
incidents of multiple ADS failures since 2003.
10
 This is a nontrivial result even over the large number of total flight 
operations conducted by Airbus airliners given the likelihood that many transient ADS failures were not 
documented. The effect of ADS failures can also be observed in general aviation (GA) aircraft incident records,
1-3
 
but concise statistics have proven more difficult to collect. For example, the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
database
1
 contains numerous instances of general aviation ADS-related failures but aggregate results for this specific 
contributing factor are not readily available. Further complicating analysis, the varied causes, effects, and results of 
ADS faults can lead to failure statistics being associated with a number of different classifications (e.g. inclement 
weather, instrument fault, and flight control failure).  
C. Air-Data System Failure Mitigation Research 
Safety in aviation is paramount, particularly for commercial aviation due to the extreme property and loss-of-life 
costs associated with aircraft accidents. Industry and government demand highly-validated systems with safety and 
availability requirements that specify a 10
-9
 maximum probability of critical failure per flight hour.
11
 Two major 
results of these standards are stringent validation requirements that slow the application of state-of-the-art concepts 
and ever-increasing complexity in the avionics employed on all classes of aircraft. The avionics of most commercial 
aircraft now feature multi-redundant self-monitoring systems with segregation and purposeful dissimilarities 
between related/redundant software and hardware; these systems require complex redundancy negotiation and 
consensus voting strategies to operate.
12,13
 While it has been noted that this complexity may induce unexpected and 
counterintuitive results, even to the point of introducing new failure modes,
14
 it is still the case that these systems 
have demonstrated high reliability. Nevertheless, these systems are still fundamentally vulnerable to failures in their 
external sensing apparatus. Further, while these complex redundancies and failure mitigation strategies enable the 
negotiation of failing redundant sensors these systems are still largely unable to handle common failure mechanisms 
simultaneously disabling entire classes of like sensors. These shortcomings are the fundamental reasons to research 
new mechanisms for air-data failure mitigation. Most research into ADS fault tolerance and recovery tends to fall 
 




into one of three categories: (1) signal-based diagnostics, (2) alternative sensing mechanisms, and (3) finding ways 
to operate without traditional ADS sensors. 
1. Signal-Based ADS Failure Rejection 
Looking first to ADS-specific failure research we find the seminal work of Houck and Atlas which provides 
insight into fundamental mechanisms for ADS failure diagnosis. Houck and Atlas analyzed failed ADS sensor 
signals and were amongst the first to propose that probe blockage reduced signal energy levels, that large signal 
variations were generally sufficient (but not necessary) to demonstrate sensor functionality, and that signal 
characteristics might be used to indicate air-data probe health.
15
 Very few examples of this type of analysis exist for 
ADS-specific applications. Houck and Atlas ultimately proposed that even at a fixed altitude the nominally-constant 
static pressure varied slightly as a function of acceleration and that the derivative of the static-port pressure signal 
would be a good indicator of probe health. Unfortunately, independent static pressure measurements are not always 
available in UAV applications as the desire for volume, weight, and cost savings make the implementation of a 
single pressure transducer for pitot-static measurements more likely. Regardless, Houck and Atlas’ methods utilize 
or suggest several of the tools that will be employed in this paper including individual signal characterization and 
comparison with previous statistics and predetermined operating thresholds. 
2. Alternative ADS Sensing Apparatus 
A more common means for avoiding failures associated with a particular class of sensors is to employ alternative 
instrumentation for the same measurements. Examples of variations on the classic ADS pitot-probe include flush 
air-data sensing (FADS) systems
16
 and self-aligning multi-hole conical probes.
17
 FADS systems employ pressure 
ports with openings flush to, and distributed over, a vehicle’s aerodynamics surfaces while self-aligning conical 
probes are driven by pressure forces into alignment with local airflows. In both cases the geometrically-related 
measurements collected at distributed sensing locations produce an over-defined system from which the ADS states 
can be re solved. These systems can provide both fault-tolerance and error reduction provided they are designed 
such that the ADS states are observable from different subsets of probes. Further, the novel structure of the sensors 
produces changes the potential failure modes and reduces the likelihood of simultaneous failure with the more 
common traditional ADS probes. The system presented in this paper will, as previously indicated, utilize alternative 
low-cost ADS sensing technologies to avoid having failure modes common across all of the vehicle’s air-data 
sensors. 
3. Circumventing ADS Sensing 
A number of researchers have proposed alternatives for flight operation in the absence of ADS measurements. 
The advent and proliferation of GPS systems and continued improvements to sensors and filtering in inertial 
navigation systems (INS) have given rise to mechanisms for deriving estimates of ADS states indirectly.
5,18-19
 
Consequently, flight control laws have emerged that do not require ADS state variables.
20-21
 Implementations of the 
latter generally have performance limitations (e.g., limits on wind speed or variability), must possess particularly 
wide margins for safe operation, and/or must employ some alternate motion sensing mechanism (e.g. machine 
vision). More pertinent to this work is the concept of ADS state estimation for which two basic formulations, 
differing by a time derivative, have been proposed. Starting from known initial conditions, such as the point of ADS 
failure, the estimation algorithms infer wind from either: a) the difference between a wind-unaware dynamic 
estimate of inertial velocity and the measure of inertial velocity
5
 or, b) the integration of lateral, longitudinal, and 
vertical accelerations by a dynamic model that includes wind.
18-19
 Regardless of the method, trigonometry is applied 
to the resulting velocity triangles to determine angle of attack and sideslip. The difficulty with these methods is their 
reliance upon high-accuracy high-rate inertial sensors and upon high-fidelity dynamic models. While these 
assumptions are reasonable for the military vehicles for which much of the referenced research was intended, they 
are not necessary appropriate for a slow-flying, low-cost UAV with MEMs-based sensors. With low-cost UAV 
platforms as the target, the algorithm presented in this paper will extract external wind estimates from the sensor 
system and leveraging wind estimates to infer wind-relative motion in the absence of trusted ADS measurements. 
III. Methods 
The fault tolerant ADS algorithm (Fig. 1) is composed of three primary elements: a signal-fault detection 
scheme, a confidence-discriminate data-fusion procedure, and an inertial measurement driven wind-estimation 
system. Signal fault detection extracts and tests signal characteristics to estimate the likelihood of sensor failure. The 
confidence-discriminate data-fusion combines the signal fault results into sensor confidence values. Confidence 
values are used to judge sensor fitness and eliminate signals from failed sensors before being used in the weighted-
average data-fusion. The wind-estimation module utilizes the resulting composite air-data vector to refine a local 
wind model which is subsequently used, in conjunction with inertial navigation measurements, to estimate the air-
 


















Figure 1. ADS Fault-Tolerant Control System Diagram 
 
data vector in the event of ADS sensor failures. This 
wind-estimate also provides a baseline wind vector 
for judging individual sensor measurements. The 
three algorithm stages are executed sequentially. 
Wind estimates are fed back to the signal-fault 
detection scheme to become one of the confidence-
rated signals combined in the data-fusion cycle. 
A. Signal Fault Detection 
The purpose of the signal-fault detection scheme is 
to discern anomalous operating conditions that may 
indicate a sensor failure. The number, type, and 
redundancy of the sensors are not considered at this 
stage, rather each signal is judged based on 
individual parameter-based signal models. The signal 
models are captured from the sensor specifications 
and the analysis of both failed and operational sensor 
signals. This stage of the algorithm is composed of 
three major procedures: signal characteristic extraction, signal model determination, and signal fault testing. 
Common methods for signal characterization in fault detection schemes include statistical metrics, such as 





Spectral decompositions are typically applied for fault detection in systems with cyclic behavior
22
 or harmonic 
content/excitation.
24
 The efficacy of frequency decomposition methods for common classes of air-data sensors are, 
as of yet, unknown but these systems do not generally have a strong frequency component. The team is currently 
investigating the application of frequency decomposition methods for propeller anemometer diagnostics, but no 
conclusions have yet been drawn. For the remaining pressure-based ADS signals we employ an arithmetic average 
and variance algorithm for signal characteristic extraction. Unlike decomposition strategies, which are focused on 
frequency-keyed information, the mean and variance are utilized to obtain smoothed, low-pass filtered, 
characteristics of a signal.
22
 In this case we will be using a sliding average and variance formulation. The k
th
 
arithmetic-average and variance over m samples of the n
th
 signal (sn(k)) is given, for the set of non-negative/not-all-
zero weighting coefficients (wi), by the formulae: 
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To reduce the number of computations per iteration, the sums of time-invariant weighting factors are normalized 
producing the following simplified formulation: 
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Exponential weighting is utilized to favor the most recent data, reducing phase delay between the raw and filtered 
signals. Our parameterized exponential weighting formula is given by: 
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The decay parameter ξ determines the relative influence of aging data points, defining a continuum between 
preserving only the most recent sample at one extreme (ξ=1) and approaching equal weighting of all points at the 
other extreme (ξ arbitrarily close to zero). We define equal weighting for the special case ξ=0. In this case, the un-
weighted arithmetic mean and standard deviation are recovered from Eqs. (1)-(2). 
 




To apply Eqs. (1)-(7) the sliding sample-window size, m, and the weight decay parameter, ξ, must be selected. 
These values were tuned empirically to balance signal tracking against delay and low-pass filter performance for 
each signal. It may be possible to formulate an optimal tuning of these parameters if a cost function can be 
formulated based on the signal following characteristics and low-pass filtering requirements. This approach did not 
prove necessary the Flying Fish sensor systems but may be appropriate for any larger or more complex ADS. The 
resulting tuned sliding average and variance formulations were then applied to the signals of functional, failed, and 
failing sensors to extract sensor model parameters for each flight mode (taxi, takeoff, climb, cruise, turning, descent, 
and landing). Average variance (          ), peak change rate (               ), and peak rate of variance 
change (               ) were extracted from functional sensor data for each signal and each flight mode. 
Performing the same calculations on failed and failing sensor data enabled the determination of tolerances for 
deviation in the model parameters. During this process it was discovered that the peak rate of change during a failure 
was generally within the normal dynamic range of our sensors. That is to say, the initial dynamics of probe failures 
are almost indistinguishable from the dynamic response of the functional system except that the measurements are 
increasingly incorrect. Subsequently, peak rate of change was discounted as a fault detection metric but tolerances 
for deviation from average variance (        ) and peak rate of variance change (             ) were recorded 
for each sensor. Drawing from the manufacturer’s specifications and failed sensor data the saturation limits of the 
sensor (         ) were quantified to give a total of six fault-detection parameters. The collected set of all fault-
detection parameters and the averaging window and decay parameter for each filter comprise the parameterized 
sensor signal model. 
The final step in the signal-fault detection process is the evaluation of extracted characteristics using the metrics 
and tolerance stored for each sensor, for each flight regime. The combination of model parameters produces three 
distinct sensor-fault tests. The first test determines if the signal variance exceeds the variance deviation threshold for 
the current flight mode: 
 
                                           (8) 
 
The result of the variance test is recorded as a binary pass (“1”) or fail (“0”) vote (         ) for each sensor at each 
time step, k. The second test determines if the signal variance increases or decreases too quickly and violates the 
peak-variation-rate tolerance. In order to make this determination we require a smooth baseline measurement of the 
signal variance for which we compute a sliding average of the variance results (          ). Again the window 
size, m, and the weight decay parameter, ξ, are selected empirically to find an acceptable tradeoff between signal 
following, smoothing, and delay. The signal test is formulated as: 
 
                                               (9) 
 
The result is a binary pass-fail vote for the variance rate test (          ) of the n
th
 sensor at the k
th
 time step. The 
final test considers if the sensor has entered a saturation region. Data analysis indicated a threshold of 3% of the 
saturation limits provided an appropriate balance between missed and false fault detection. The set of all flight data 
demonstrated that an operational sensor’s signal remain further than 3% from the saturation limit for over 99% of all 
measurements. Conversely, failures that produced saturated signals approached within 3% of the saturation limit for 
99% of subsequent incorrect measurements. The primary occurrence of saturation in the un-failed sensor is low-
speed saturation for extremely low or zero air speed (or a slight tailwind) prior to initiating takeoff. The tests for 
saturation take the form: 
                                (10a) 
                                (10b) 
 
This test produces, as with the previous tests, a binary indication a saturation test failure of the n
th
 sensor at the k
th
 
time step (         ). Finally, the time history of sensor fault votes is output to the confidence-discriminate data-
fusion algorithm in order to develop sensor confidence values. 
B. Confidence-Discriminate Data Fusion 
The goal of confidence-discriminate data-fusion is to leverage signal confidence and redundant-data comparisons 
to combine like measurements while excluding failed sensors. This sensor discrimination and data fusion process is 
comprised of three steps: signal confidence determination, failed sensor rejection, and final data fusion. 
 




The signal confidence of the n
th
 signal (Cn(k)) is developed from the time history of signal-fault votes for that 
sensor in a two step process. First we accumulate signal-fault votes into a probability that a sensor has passed a 
specific fault test. This probability is created by using a large-window moving average which allows failure votes to 
have a long influence period and also mitigates spurious intermittent false-negative/positive votes. For this we 
define probabilities for each of the three primary fault types: signal variance exceeds threshold (Pvar), rate of 
variance change exceeds threshold (Prate), and signal exceeds saturation tolerance (Psat). The probabilities are created 
by a moving average of the binary voting history for each fault: 
 
                                   (11a) 
                                    (11b) 
                                   (11c) 
 
The second step is to combine the three failure-voting probabilities into the final signal confidence by a weighted 
average. The two variance probabilities are given even weighting (0.3) while the saturation probability is given a 
slightly higher weighting factor (0.4). 
 
                                             (12) 
 
This distribution is best explained by examining the features of our fault detection process. Specifically, a complete 
saturation fault indicates an undeniable failure condition whereas the variance-based faults indicate only a likelihood 
of sensor failure. By giving a slightly greater weight to the saturation test we can select a confidence threshold (0.7) 
that is exceeded in the event of a complete saturation failure but that cannot be surpassed by any single variance 
failure. Armed with confidence values for each signal the error-rejection and data fusion can be completed. 
Perhaps the most important requirements for a fault-tolerant system are mechanisms for judging and rejecting 
questionable signals from the set of all available sensors. Willsky’s survey of design methods for failure detection 
provides a good summary of this field.
25
 Common methods include neural networks, voting or outlier rejection, 
model-based analysis, and filter-based techniques, including recursive least-squares and the Kalman filter.
26-30
 We 
will focused on outlier rejection (OR) and voting; these concepts are closely related but typically utilize different 
operating principles. Voting schema are often comprised of rule-based judgments. Outlier rejection, on the other 
hand, generally relies on statistical analysis and, while subjectivity remains in the selection of metrics and 
thresholds, OR methods are usually based on commonly accepted statistical practices/measures (e.g. using a 
multiple of the standard deviation to define an outlier). A comprehensive treatment of outlier rejection in statistical 
data can be found in Barnett and Lewis.
31
 For this paper we will utilize sensor confidence as a per-signal voting 
mechanism and employ a simple outlier rejection scheme whenever three or more redundant signals are available. 
As previously indicated a confidence threshold of 0.7 was selected; whenever a signal’s confidence drops below this 
threshold it is rejected from data fusion. If three or more redundant measurements remain after the confidence-based 
elimination they are subject to a consensus-seeking outlier rejection scheme that eliminate signals too dissimilar 
(subject to a threshold) from any majority amongst all signals. Utilizing Eqs. (1) and (2) confidence-weighted 
average and variance are computed for the set of redundant sensors. The square root of the variance gives the 
standard deviation of the set of signals. Any signal that is more than one standard deviation from the average is 
eliminated. 
 
                                   (13) 
 
The remaining mathematical concepts that must be considered are the class of methods employed for data fusion. 
Hall and Llinas provide a comprehensive introduction to data fusion and a comparison and classification of data 
fusion operators can be found in Block’s 1994 manuscript.
32-33
 It can be shown that a great many of the filter-based 
data fusion algorithms are based on least-square error concepts.
34
 A noisy measurement (zi) of some value (xi) 
subject to zero-mean uncorrelated white noise (vi) with variance  
 , can be written as: 
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We can formulate an unbiased estimator (    as the weighted summation of noisy measurements (zi): 
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Minimization of the expected error between the estimator and signal recovers the weighted arithmetic average. 
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However, since the signal confidence calculations already indirectly consider signal variance it is more useful at this 
juncture to substitute confidence-based weights as they capture a greater amount of data than variance-based 
weighting alone. A linear confidence weighting, which reduces to zero at the confidence threshold, can be given for 
n redundant sensors by: 
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Recall that the low-confidence signals have already been eliminated, so the weighting strategy above gives a 
normalized positive weighting that satisfies the requirements for the weighted average. The resulting combined air-
data measurements are output to the wind-estimation system for the development of the inertial-measurement based 
auxiliary air-data estimate. 
C. Wind Estimation 
The goal of the wind estimator is the generation of an air-data vector that can serve as both a reference for ADS 
failure detection and a failsafe reading to promote safe pilot/autopilot operation of ADS-dependant flight controls in 
the event of partial/complete air-data sensor failure. The wind estimation scheme has two effective modes: nominal 
operation, wherein some number of ADS sensors are functional and wind estimation is dominated by direct 
measurements, and failsafe operation where, in the absence of ADS inputs, winds are estimated from previously 
collected wind statics. Refinements to this model would require higher fidelity models for both the aircraft and 
environmental wind processes. Such models are typically more readily available for commercial aircraft than for 
small UAS. The primary mechanism for wind estimation and, subsequently, air-data vector estimation is a three step 
process of extracting inertial wind measurements from body-relative sensors, updating the wind estimate, and 
recovering air-data measures from the wind model and current inertial measurements. 
Wind model relationships to body and inertial measurements are expressed by rotation matrices for pitch ( ), roll 
( ), and yaw ( ) Euler angles about the x, y, and z axes, respectively: 
 
                                (20a,b,c) 
 
The first step in the wind estimation procedure is to resolve an inertial referenced environmental wind measurement 
from high-confidence air-data vector and vehicle motions. We first develop the measured airspeed (u(k)) into a 
vector in the aircraft body frame (B) using angle-of-attack (α(k)) and sideslip (β(k)): 
 
                                
         (21) 
 
This vector is subsequently rotated into the inertial frame (I) using the aircraft’s roll (ϕ(k)), pitch (θ(k)), and yaw 
(ψ(k)) Euler angles: 
 
                                              (22) 
 
To recover an inertial wind measurement (wind(k)) we must add the body’s inertial frame velocity (     ) to the 
body relative airspeed vector: 
 
                                  (23) 
 





The next step is to update the actual wind model. For the small unmanned seaplane we employ a simple spatially-
uniform average-based wind model. The locally measured wind (primarily during drift) is accepted as the global 
wind estimate with a weighted time average of the wind measurements used as a reasonable estimate of the current 
steady wind. Further the wind is assumed to only have velocity components in a local horizontal plane, that is, there 
is no vertical component of wind. This set of assumptions are reasonable for the Flying Fish mission as it will transit 
through only a small range of altitudes (<100m) and over a fairly short distance (<1000m) and time (2-5min) during 
each flight. With an updated wind model we can construct the inertial-measure-based ADS estimates. First we 
recover the estimated inertial-frame airspeed vector (   
    ) by differencing the wind estimate with the vehicle 
velocity: 
 
   
                                        (24) 
 
Rotating the inertial airspeed vector estimate by the Euler into the body frame produces a body-frame relative 
airspeed vector estimate (   
    ): 
 
   
                                  
            (25) 
 
Trigonometry can then be applied to recover the angle of attack and sideslip values: 
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Airspeed is recovered from the magnitude of the body-frame airspeed vector estimate: 
 
         
                      (28) 
D. Algorithm Summary 
Unmanned Seaplane ADS Fault Tolerance Algorithm: 
1. Signal Fault Detection Block: 
     Input: Sensor signals: sn(k) 
     Output: Fault detection votes: Λvar(n,k), Λrate(n,k), Λsat(n,k) 
a) Extract signal characteristics (Eqn. 3-4) 
b) Select test parameters for current flight mode 
c) Perform fault detection tests: 
i. Variance within expected thresholds, vote Pass/Fail: 1/0 = Λvar(n,k) (Eqn. 8) 
ii. Rate of variance change within expected thresholds, vote Pass/Fail: 1/0 = Λrate(n,k) (Eqn. 9) 
iii. Signal response sufficiently far from saturation, vote Pass/Fail: 1/0= Λsat(n,k) (Eqn. 10a,b) 
2. Confidence-Discriminate Data-Fusion Block: 
     Input: Fault votes: Λvar(n,k), Λrate(n,k), Λsat(n,k) 
     Output: High-confidence ADS values: α(k), β(k), u(k) 
a) Sensor confidence assessment: 
i. Compute probabilities for each failure type: Pvar, Prate, Psat (Eqn. 11a,b,c) 
ii. Compute confidence for each sensor: Cn(k) (Eqn. 12) 
b) Sensor voting / outlier rejection: 
i. Reject low confidence signals (Cn(k) < 0.7) 
ii. Reject outliers (Eqn. 13) 
c) Confidence-weighted sensor fusion (Eqn. 3, 19) 
 





Figure 2. Variance analysis – functional sensor 





































Figure 3. Variance analysis - failed sensor 







































Figure 5. Composite sensor confidence 




























Figure 4. Signal fault detection votes 






























3. Wind Estimation Block: 
     Input: High confidence ADS values: α(k), β(k), u(k) 
     Output: Estimated ADS values: α*(k), β*(k), u*(k) 
a) Compute kth Wind Estimate: wind(k) 
i. Resolve airspeed (u) as body-frame vector (Eqn. 21) 
ii. Rotate air-data vector into inertial frame (Eqn. 22) 
iii. Compute wind (Eqn. 23) 
b) Update wind average:                (Eqn. 3) 
c) Construct airspeed, AOA, and sideslip estimates from wind estimate: 
i. Compute inertial-frame air-vector estimate (Eqn. 24) 
ii. Rotate estimated air-vector into body-frame (Eqn. 25) 
iii. Determine estimated ADS values from body-frame air-vector (Eqn. 26-28) 
IV. Results 
The algorithm was first tuned and tested with pre-recorded flight data from the first-generation Flying Fish. This 
data provides a very good basis for testing and development as it contains a wide variety of ADS failures. The full 
algorithm was then applied, after tuning, to the second-generation Flying Fish vehicle with its dual heated 5-
hole/pitot-static probes and propeller-anemometer ADS. All of these results will be summarized below. 
 





Figure 8. Algorithm results - double probe failure 





























Figure 9. ADS failure during high-speed taxi 




































Figure 6. Wind-model airspeed estimate (no-failures) 
































Figure 7. Algorithm results - single probe failure 


























A. Autonomous Seaplane Example: Generation I 
Datasets from our first generation autonomous seaplane provide a wide range of test cases including: single and 
double in-flight pitot/static failures, intermittent failures, and datasets that begin with failed sensors. As discussed in 
the algorithm description signal characteristics are extracted from the analysis and comparison of functional (Fig. 2) 
and failed (Fig. 3) ADS sensors data. 
After tuning the sample the characteristic extraction and signal conditioning parameters the algorithm 
successfully rendered valid binary votes for the three classes of signal-faults (Fig. 4). The results of the binary fault 
detection decisions are then combined to determine composite sensor confidence (Fig. 5). 
The wind-model air-data estimate shows good correlation with functional ADS sensors (Fig. 6). The complete 
algorithm, combining the wind model, signal confidence, voting, and data fusion to produce a single high-
confidence airspeed has been tested for a wide range of cases including single (Fig. 7) and double (Fig. 8) airspeed 
sensor failure cases. 
B. Autonomous Seaplane Example: Generation II 
Following the development of the algorithm with the legacy data, as reviewed above, the algorithm was applied 
to the second generation flight vehicle. In this section we will present test results from these sensors as well as wind-
model airspeed estimates and the final composite high-confidence airspeed results. 
The failure mitigation system performed well during preliminary testing. The algorithm accurately handled 
errors both during high-speed taxi tests (Fig. 9) and during simple flight tests (Fig. 10). During the high-speed taxi 
test (Fig. 9) the algorithm correctly eliminates an erroneous sensor excursion during the approach to hydroplaning 
 





Figure 12. ADS failures during flight through rain 
































Figure 10. ADS failure during flight testing 






































Figure 11. Recovery of initially failed ADS sensor 





































speeds (75s) and also correctly rejects a high-pressure blockage that biases the one of the airspeeds high after 85s. 
Flight test results (Fig. 10) show the algorithm correctly rejecting low-speed saturation in (0-100s) and, similar to 
the taxi test, rejecting a high-pressure biased signal during descent/landing (125s). These tests also demonstrate 
some interesting dynamics and issues associated with the propeller anemometer. At low airspeed the counting limit 
of the digital timer and the rotating friction of the propeller produce saturation effects. Conversely at high speeds the 
sensor response is increasingly non-linear as the small 3cm propeller is driven to rotation speeds in excess of 
11000rpm. Furthermore the installed prototype anemometer was subject to greater wear than previously anticipated. 
Continuous high-speed rotation during flight began to erode the propeller’s waterproof bushings resulting in 
misalignment of the propeller and hall-effect sensors. The team found that while the anemometer could be realigned 
on shore each morning, giving good results for early flight tests (Fig. 9), the progressive wear and stresses of flight 
testing resulted in non-negligible signal degradation over the course of a day (Fig. 10). The team anticipates 
correcting the design issue with an 
update to the propeller bearing of the 
miniature anemometer prototype. 
Continued testing allowed the 
algorithm to handle increasingly difficult 
failures. One of the first major trials for 
the failure mitigation system was a flight 
test that began with a blocked pitot-static 
probe. Consensus voting was able to 
distinguish the correct signals after 
sensor confidence was established (Fig. 
11) and the signal was successfully 
reintegrated to the confidence voting 
procedure when the probes blockage 
cleared (85s). More impressive however 
are the results obtained during flight 
testing in a rainstorm (Fig. 12). The 
ADS algorithm successfully rejects 
several erroneous ADS sensor 
excursions and negotiates a complete 
sensor failure and two subsequent probe 
recoveries. 
V. Conclusion 
Air-data system measurements are critical for robust takeoff performance in an autonomous seaplane and are 
central to flight control laws across all aircraft classes. Harsh environmental conditions can lead to systematic 
failures of multiple homogeneous sensors which may not be adequately handled by common fault tolerance 
 




mechanisms designed to handle isolated failures. The algorithm described above has been shown to negotiate a high-
confidence air-data vector from sets of redundant air-data sensors subject to failure. The system provides a failsafe 
capability through the application of an inertial navigation system to a wind model. Algorithm inputs are not limited 
in number or type except that they must provide a numerically quantifiable signal. Known limitations of the 
algorithm include heavy reliance on the appropriate selection of fundamental analysis parameters (sample sizes, 
weighting, and filtering frequencies) and a requirement for accurate knowledge of sensor performance. 
Continued efforts are expected to produce a simulation of suitable complexity and fidelity to more completely 
test the performance of the algorithm. Currently the authors are working to develop appropriate dynamic models for 
the flight vehicle and atmospheric wind processes in order create a high fidelity wind estimation system with 
increased estimation capability and fewer constraints. Furthermore we hope to explore a combined implementation 
of the dynamic-model air-vector estimation mechanisms discussed in references 5, 18, and 19 to produce higher 
accuracy in-flight estimates of the ADS states and better handle probe failure. Perhaps the most important pending 
work is the analysis and automation of parameter selection for the tuning of the ADS confidence filter system. While 
this process was fairly straightforward for the Flying Fish vehicles, for which our algorithm proved robust to 
variations in the tuning parameters, the broader application of this method would require greater 
understanding/quantification of the effects of modifying filter parameters. A more robust and general-purpose 
application of our filter may benefit from automated parameter selection or adaptation to yield optimal 
environmentally-tuned results. 
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